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This paper examines the effects of board of director characteristics and compositions, earnings 
management on fraud for Taiwan listed SES and OTC companies. The effects of Institutional director 
holding, the duality of board chair and CEO have not influence on fraud before the act of the 
independent directors and auditor, but Institutional director holding, the duality of board chair and CEO 
has negative influence on fraud afterward. The discretionary working capital accrual has not influence 
on fraud and the interaction of institutional director holding and the discretionary working capital 
accrual has negative influence on fraud before the act of the independent directors and auditor, but the 
discretionary working capital accrual has negative influence on fraud afterward. The interaction of 
independent director holdings and the discretionary accrual has positive influence on fraud after the act 
of the independent directors and auditor. It is ironical to promotion of the corporate government system 
in Taiwan that increasing independence director holdings would increase the influence of discretionary 
accrual on fraud.  
 
Key words: Fraud, earnings management, board of director logit regression analysis, corporate governance. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The corporate governance system in the United States is 
viewed as a model for the developing market in Taiwan. 
The accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom and Nortel 
Networks mean that investors now lack confidence in the 
corporate governance system, and take a cautious 
approach to investment in the equity market. Further-
more, the exposure of fraudulent companies in Taiwan, 
such as Procomp Informatics, Summit Computer 
Technology and Infodisc Technology, reveals the lack of 
complaint procedures in many businesses. By separating 
ownership from operational management, corporate 
governance systems provide a set of mechanisms 
designed to supervise insider managers effectively, and 
to resolve problems with agencies (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Jackling 
and Johl, 2009). The main issue in corporate governanceis 
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is the role of the board of directors in overseeing how 
management serves the long - term interests of 
shareowners and other stakeholders, as well as 
overseeing the duties of the inside and outside directors 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Inside directors are not only managers, but also 
executors. They have rich insider information, and may 
collaborate with company administrators to work against 
the interests of shareowners (Fama, 1980; Williamson, 
1983; Singh and Harianto, 1989). Outside directors 
include both those independent of the company (except 
for board service) and so-called “gray directors” with 
some non - board affiliation to the top management of the 
company (Beasley, 1998; Uzun et al., 2004). Companies 
can appoint comprehensive and specialized independent 
directors to improve management mechanisms for 
optimal supervision and fraud prevention (Beasley, 1996; 
Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Seamer and Psaros, 
2000; Sharma, 2004; Uzun et al., 2004; Doidge et al., 
2007; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009). However, gray  
  
 
 
directors are often found in family businesses, or are 
company clients, making fraud difficult to detect. 
Earnings management, which refers to the manipu-
lation of the profit and loss figures in financial statements, 
frequently occurs in the process of financial reporting 
(Schipper, 1989). Stakeholders monitor the managers 
and make decisions according to earnings performance, 
because they cannot directly observe how their company 
allocates resources (Sunder, 1997). To avoid bad 
company financial reports, managers may attribute poor 
performance to carelessness; adopt earnings manage-
ment techniques to improve the appearance of the 
financial statement. Therefore, the manipulation of 
earnings has replaced objective financial reporting. 
Furthermore, fraudulent manipulation of earnings to 
provide the appearance that expected earnings have 
been achieved is increasing steadily (Defond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994; Dechow et al., 1996; 
Beneish, 1997; Martin et al., 2002; Doyle et al., 2007).  
The study of corporate governance focuses not only on 
the influence of the composition and characteristics of 
boards of directors on earnings management, but also 
how they affect fraud events. Specifically, this investi-
gation explores both the effect of the compositions and 
characteristics of boards of directors and of earnings 
management, on financial fraud in Taiwanese companies 
listed on the SEC and OTC. First, the influence of the 
compositions (inside director ratio, independent director 
ratio, gray director ratio, outside director ratio and 
institutional investor ratio) and characteristics (chairman 
as general manager, number of board meetings and 
board size) of boards of directors on fraud is examined. 
Second, the relationship between earnings management 
and fraud is investigated. Finally, the influence of the 
interactive relationship between compositions and 
characteristics of board of directors and earnings 
management on fraud events is examined. This paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related 
literature. Next, section 3 describes the sample selection, 
the demographics of the sample and research design. 
Moreover, section 4 contains the empirical result of the 
study using a sample 178 firms that engaged in 
fraudulent financial reporting. Finally, section 5 discusses 
the results and presents conclusion. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Board of director characteristics and fraudulent 
financial reporting  
  
Prior researches have analyzed the relationship between 
the Board of Directors and fraudulent financial reporting 
(Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al., 1999; Doyle et al., 2007; 
Bowen et al., 2008). Based on results from logit 
regression analysis, Beasley (1996) determined that non 
- fraudulent firms have boards with  a  significantly  higher  
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percentage of outside members than fraudulent firms; 
however, the presence of an auditing committee does not 
significantly affect the likelihood of financial statement 
fraud. Moreover, as outside director ownership in a firm 
and outside director tenure on a board increase, and as 
the number of outside directors in other firms held by 
outside director decreases, the likelihood of financial 
statement fraud decreases. In this study, Beasley (2000) 
demonstrated that the nature of corporate governance 
differs between fraudulent and non - fraudulent 
companies; non - fraudulent companies have a higher 
percentage of outside directors on their boards than 
fraudulent boards and generally have audit committees 
staffed by independent parties. 
  Agrawal et al., (1999) found little systemic evidence 
that firms suspected or charged with fraud have 
unusually high turnover rates among senior managers or 
directors in technology, health care and financial services 
industries. Univariate comparisons indicated that some 
evidence exists that firms committing fraud have higher 
managerial and director turnover rates. However multiva-
riate tests for other firm attributes, such evidence dos not 
exist. These analytical findings suggest that the revelation 
of fraud does not generally increase net benefits for 
changing managers or a firm's leadership structure. 
Moreover, Cloninger and Waller (2000) investigated 
whether securities firms experience any significant beta 
shifts upon initial disclosure of alleged corporate fraud. 
Empirical tests identified evidence consistent with the 
theory that agents engage in illegal activity in an attempt 
to increase share price. Empirical results also provided 
additional insight into the question of why corporations 
engage in criminal activity. The goal of specify is to 
smooth earnings and make a company appear stable, 
which translates into a market beta, entice additional 
shareholders to purchase company stock. Seamer and 
Psaros (2000) obtained empirical evidence for the 
relationship between independent directors on a corpo-
rate board and the incidence of management-perpetrated 
fraud in Australian public companies during 1985 – 1998. 
Empirical results provided support non-fraudulent firms 
were had a significantly higher proportion of independent 
directors on their boards than fraudulent firms. The study 
by Seamer has two important implications. First, 
empirical evidence supports the appointment of manda-
tory levels of independent directors to the boards of 
Australian public companies. Second, evidence of a 
relationship between board composition and incidence of 
management fraud may prove useful to auditors when 
making risk assessment and planning the extent of audit 
tests for fraud. Moreover, Seamer (2004) also found that 
negative relationship existed between the proportion of 
independent directors and institutional investors and the 
likelihood of fraud, whereas a positive relationship existed 
between duality (chair of a board and the chief executive 
officer) and likelihood of fraud.  
Dunn (2004) investigated the relationship  between  top  
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management team duality and the decision to release 
false financial information. Using a matched sample of 
103 firms convicted of publishing fraudulent financial 
statements in 1992 - 1996, analytical results show that 
such illegal corporate behavior is most likely when power 
is concentrated in the hands of insiders. In such firms, 
insiders control top management and the board of 
directors by simultaneously occupying key managerial 
positions that have considerable power within the firm 
while sitting on a board (duality), and through their 
ownership interests in a firm. Uzun et al. (2004) analyzed 
how various characteristics of boards of directors and 
other governing groups impacted the occurrence of U.S. 
corporate fraud in 1978 - 2001. Analytical findings 
obtained by Uzun et al. verified a positive relationship 
between board structure and the likelihood of corporate 
fraud as the number of independent outside directors 
increased on a board; when the number increased on an 
auditing board and compensation committees, the 
likelihood of corporate fraud declined. On average, frau-
dulent companies had larger boards, a larger percentage 
of inside directors, and a higher percentage of grey 
directors, whereas non-fraudulent firms had a higher 
percentage of independent outside directors. Although 
the study controlled for CEO tenure, board member 
tenure was not analyzed as a model variable (Andres and 
Vallelado, 2008; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). 
 
 
Earnings management and fraudulent financial 
reporting  
 
Previous studies investigated extreme instances of 
earnings management identified by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) (Feroz et al. 1991; Beneish 
1997; Bonner et al. 1998; Porta et al., 2006; Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2007), or listed potential earnings - 
management approaches based on personal experience 
and/or published accounts (Schilit 1993; Mulford and 
Comiskey 1996). These studies naturally focused on 
instances of earnings management that markedly biased 
audited financial statements and attracted the attention of 
the SEC or the public. Dechow et al. (1996) investigated 
companies subject to accounting enforcement actions by 
the U.S. SEC for alleged violations of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAPs). Dechow et al. 
demonstrated that firms manipulating earnings are more 
likely to have boards of directors dominated by manage-
ment and more likely to have a CEO who simultaneously 
serves as board chairman than firms not manipulating 
earnings. Additionally, firms manipulating earnings are 
most likely to have a CEO who is also the firm founder, 
less likely to have an audit committee and less likely to 
have an outside blockholder than firms that do not 
manipulate earnings. Finally, Dechow et al. determined 
that firms manipulating earnings experience significant 
increases in capital costs when manipulations are made 
public.  
 
 
 
 
Park and Shin (2004) found that only when outside 
directors have financial expertise are able to deter 
earnings manipulation in Canada. Increasing the propor-
tion of outside directors per se does not deter earnings 
manipulation; what is needed is outside directors who 
have backgrounds in accounting or finance. Analytical 
findings obtained by Park and Shin agree with those of 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005). Aldhizer and Cashell (2006) 
demonstrated that 74% of all AAERs were involved in 
overstating revenue or, to a lesser extent, understating 
revenue. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
Sample data 
 
This investigation adopted a sample of fraudulent listed companies 
on the SEC and OTC in Taiwan during the period January 1999 to 
December 2004. The fraudulent companies were identified by 
searching the Commercial Times and Taiwan-based Economic 
Daily News with key words to identify firms that had been convicted 
by the courts of fraudulent financial reporting. Relevant financial 
data were obtained from the prospectuses of Taiwanese listed 
companies on SEC and OTC, the TEJ database (Taiwan Economic 
Journal) and the “Market Observation Post System” of the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange Corporation (http://newmops.tse.com.tw/). The 
financial and insurance sectors were eliminated from this study in 
accordance with the stipulations of the special law of the Taiwanese 
security market. Therefore, 89 fraudulent companies were found. 
Furthermore, 89 non-fraudulent companies, as reported in the 
above specialized financial media and matched according to SIC 
codes in the same industry, were also selected. Thus, total of 178 
samples were applied in this study. Table 1 lists the industrial 
distribution of the sample. 
 
 
Demographic data 
 
Dependent variable 
 
This study employed the definitions of fraud provided by Karpoff 
and Lott (1993): (1) fraud against stakeholders in a company, such 
as suppliers, employees and clients, e.g., embezzlement and 
market manipulation; (2) fraud against the government, such as 
fictitious trade; (3) fraud in financing statement from misstating the 
company’s financial condition, e.g., fraudulent financial reporting 
and prospectus, and (4) violating regulations relating to public 
companies and related compliance matters, e.g., bribery, insider 
trading, violating antitrust laws, environmental pollution, illegal 
payment, discrimination against employees, price fixing and 
fraudulent advertising.  
 
Independent variable 
 
(a) Board of director compositions  
 
(i) Ratio of independent directors (Inddir): Inddir = the 
percentage of board members who are considered “independent” 
directors, that is, outside directors with no ties to the firm outside 
their role as director. Independent directors represent all outside 
directors except grey directors. 
 
(ii) Ratio of outside directors (Outdir): Outdir = the percentage of 
board members who are non-employee directors.  
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Table 1. The distribution of fraudulent category. 
 
                          Year 
 Category 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Sample (%) 
Insider trading 14 7 3 12 10 12 58(44.96) 
Fraudulent financial reporting 1 1 1 1 4 0 8(6.20) 
Fraudulent prospectus 1 0 0 0 0 1 2(1.55) 
Manipulate markets 12 6 0 2 1 4 25(19.38) 
Ficititious trades 2 0 0 0 1 1 4(3.10) 
Embezzlement 11 7 3 6 2 3 32(24.81) 
Total 41 21 7 21 18 21 129(100) 
 
 
 
(iii) Ratio of inside directors (Indir): Indir = percentage of the 
board members who participate in the corporate operation.  
 
(iv) Ratio of gray directors (Graydir): Graydir = percentage of the 
board members who are grey directors. Grey directors represent all 
outside directors who are related to management, consultants 
/supplier to the firm, outside attorneys who perform legal work for 
the firm, retired executives of the firm, or investment bankers 
because they are not viewed as being independent of 
management. 
 
(v) Ratio of Institutional investor (Instdir): Instdir =  percentage 
of the board members who represent Government agencies, 
domestic financial institutions, domestic trust funds, corporations, 
other juridical persons, foreign financial institutions, foreign juridical 
persons and foreign trust funds.  
 
 
(b) Board of director characteristics  
 
(i) Chairman as CEO (Dceo): Dceo = is dummy variable with a 
value of one if the chairman works as CEO concurrently and a 
value of zero otherwise. 
 
(ii) Board size (B size): B size = the number of directors on the 
board.  
 
(c) Earnings management 
 
(i) Discretionary Accruals (DA): This paper uses a modified 
version of Jones' (1991) model, as developed by Dechow et al. 
(1995), to measure earnings management. To estimate 
discretionary accruals, we subtract the changes of accounts 
receivable and property, plant, and equipment from the changes of 
net sales. The estimation is based on the following: 
Step 1. To estimate non-discretionary accruals (NDA t)  
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Where TACt denote the total accruals on period t; PPEt denote the 
total plant, property and equipment on period t; TAt-1 denote the 
total accruals of the i th company on period t-1; REVt denote the 
changes of the operating revenue on period t; ARt denote the 
changes of the accounts receivable on period t. 
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tADˆN
 of each firm for each period can be calculated following we 
get the estimators of 0, 1 and 2. 
Step 2. To estimate discretionary accruals (DA t) 
   
ttt ADNTACDA ˆ−=
 
Where TACt denotes the total accruals on period t; tAD
ˆN denote 
the non-discretionary accruals of each firm. 
 
(ii) Discretionary Working Capital Accruals (DWCA): Peasnell et 
al. (2000) employ the working capital accruals (WCA) version of the 
Jones model and the estimation is based on the following: 
Step 1. To estimate working capital accruals (WCAt) 
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Where WCAt denote the working capital accruals on period t; TAt-1 
denote the total accruals on period t-1; REVt denote the changes 
of the operating revenue on period t. 
  
Step 2. To estimate non - discretionary working capital accruals 
(NDWCAt) 
NDWCAt of each firm can be calculated following we get the 
estimators of 0
αˆ
 and 1αˆ of each firm. 
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Where ARt denote the changes of the accounts receivable on 
period t. 
 
 Step 3. To estimate discretionary working capital accruals (DWCAt) 
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Control variable 
 
There are five control variables: firm size, industry category 
(D1~D18), financial performance, ratio of debt and group 
enterprise. This paper utilizes firm size  as  the  proxy  variable  that  
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were calculated as the difference in the logarithms of book value of 
total asset (Sharma, 2004; Harris and Raviv, 2008). Furthermore, 
this study utilizes industry category of listed companies on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange (Simpson, 1986) to examine whether 
specific industries exist illegal corporate behavior easily. The control 
variable, financial performance and ratio of debt (Peasnell et al., 
2000) is used to investigate whether poor financial performance 
and high ratio of debt of corporate also exist illegal corporate 
behavior respectively.  
 
 
Empirical model 
 
This paper utilizes logit model to measure the effect of the board of 
director compositions, characteristics and earning management on 
the fraud. The variable, 
*
iY
, is unobserved latent variable.  
 
iit XY εβ +=∗
                                                                     (1) 
                                                    
Where Xi denote the vectors of explanatory variables. (1, Xi2, Xi3,…, 
Xik); =(1, 2,…, k); i is random disturbance term of standard 
normal distribution, E(i, i) = 0, ji ≠∀ . Therefore, the relationship 
of Yi and 
*
iY
 will be that if 
*
iY   0, then Yi =1 and if 
*
iY ?0, then 
Yi =0 and the average of Yi will be    
( ) ( ) ( )01 >=== ∗iiri YPYPYE
 ( )βε iir XP ′−>=
 ( )βiX ′Φ=
 
                     
When  is S-shaped like the logistic curve, we get the logistic 
model and have closed form function. Logistic model has the 
following form: 
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E(Yi)=i, marginal effect of a change in Xij, on the probability of Yi 
=1 has the following form:   
 
( )iij
ij
i
X
pipiβpi −=
∂
∂ 1
                                         
Equation. (2) denote the cumulative distribution function. 
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Logistic regression applies maximum likelihood methods to 
estimate parameter , and log likelihood function is as follows: 
                   
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] +−=−−+== ββpipi `1ln1ln1lnln ` iXiiiiii eXYYY
                        
                                                                                                       (4) 
 
The partial derivatives of the Equation (4) with respect to  that is to 
get the first order necessary conditions and simultaneous equations 
on maximum likelihood estimator of . Owing to  is nonlinear 
function it has to solve using numerical methods such as Newton-
Raphson. Then we utilize the information matrix to solve the 
asymptotic covariance matrix, and the information matrix is as 
follows: 
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
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                                                                (5) 
 
The asymptotic distribution of log likelihood statistics is as follow 
and   denotes the maximal log likelihood value of equation (4). 
                  
    
( ) 2 10 ~2 −−− kχ
                                                               (6) 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULT 
 
Basic statistics 
 
Table 1 lists the distribution of fraudulent category, thus, 
in the study sample, most studies of the insider trading 
had the highest proportion of samples (44.96%), followed 
by embezzlement (24.81%), manipulate markets 
(19.38%), fraudulent financial reporting (6.20%), ficititious 
trades (3.10%) and fraudulent prospectus (1.55%). 
Furthermore, Table 1 lists the industrial distribution of 
fraudulent companies, and Electronics had the highest 
number of the study samples (33). Table 2 presents the 
results on the basic statistics of the study sample and its 
t-test (Mann - Whitney U test) statistics for assessing 
whether the difference in mean (median) between 
fraudulent company and no-fraudulent company is 
statistically significant. It reveals that there is insignificant 
difference on board of director compositions and 
characteristics between fraudulent and no-fraudulent 
company. However, regarding the earnings management, 
there is statistically significant difference between 
fraudulent and no - fraudulent company. 
 
 
Correlation analysis 
 
Independent variables and dependent variables 
 
The correlation of fraud and Chairman as CEO (Dceo) 
that used point - biserial correlation to analysis; others 
used Pearson correlation. Table 3 presents the results of 
the correlation analysis and reveals that discretionary 
accruals   (discretionary   working    capital    accruals)   is  
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Table 2. Basic statistics of fraudulent sample. 
 
Variable Category Mean Median Max Min S. D. 
Fraud 0.022 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.074 
Non-Fraud 0.016 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.071 
Inddir 
 
 
 
All 0.019 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.072 
Fraud 0.610 0.667 1.000 0.000 0.272 
Non-Fraud 0.595 0.667 1.000 0.000 0.275 
Outdir 
 
 
 
All 0.603 0.667 1.000 0.000 0.273 
Fraud 0.214 0.167 0.800 0.000 0.182 
Non-Fraud 0.231 0.200 1.000 0.000 0.195 
Indir 
 
 
 
All 0.223 0.200 1.000 0.000 0.188 
Fraud 0.223 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.290 
Non-Fraud 0.247 0.200 1.000 0.000 0.263 
Graydir 
 
 
 
All 0.235 0.174 1.000 0.000 0.276 
Fraud 0.517 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.346 
Non-Fraud 0.494 0.444 1.000 0.000 0.338 
Instdir 
 
 
 
All 0.505 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.342 
Fraud 7.157 7.000 26.000 3.000 3.605 
Non-Fraud 7.348 7.000 20.000 3.000 3.181 
Bsize 
 
 
 
All 7.253 7.000 26.000 3.000 3.391 
Fraud 0.281 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.452 
Non-Fraud 0.371 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.486 
Dceo 
 
 
 
All 0.326 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.470 
Fraud -528962b -197389c 5442121 -12238310 2391610 
Non-Fraud 271418b 78387c 19123076 -5049685 2325178 
DA 
 
 
 
All -128772 -2197 19123076 -12238310 2385949 
Fraud 628a -66984c 16482168 -12832441 3269547 
Non-Fraud 1517486 a 533181c 20105894 -1516232 3386446 
DWCA 
All 759057 190411 20105894 -12832441 3405121 
 
Notes: 1. a (b) denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) level and is checked by t-test statistics for assessing whether the 
difference in mean between fraudulent company. 
2. c (d) denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) level and is checked by Mann-Whitney U test statistics for assessing whether 
the difference in median between fraudulent company. 
 
 
 
significantly negative related at 5% significant level on 
fraud. However, there is no statistically significant 
difference among others. 
 
 
Independent variables and independent variables 
 
Outside director ratio is significantly negatively related to 
inside director ratio (gray director ratio), -0.554 (-0.815), 
at 5% significant level. Moreover, institutional investor 
ratio is significantly negatively related to inside director 
ratio (gray director ratio), -0.270 (-0.285), and board size 
is also significantly negatively related to inside director 
ratio. Finally, there is significantly positive relationship (-
0.158) between Chairman as CEO and board size. 
Additionally, there is significantly positive relationship, 
0.351, between outside director ratio and institutional 
investor ratio, then, board size is significantly positively 
related to outside director ratio (institutional investor ratio) 
at 5% significant level. Chairman as CEO is significantly 
positively related at the 5% level to inside director ratio 
and   discretionary  accruals  is  also  obviously  positively  
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Table 3. Correlation analysis.  
 
Variable Fraud Inddir Outdir Indir Graydir Instdir Bsize Dceo DA DWCA 
Fraud 
 
1.000          
Inddir 
 
 
0.059 
(0.583) 
1.000 
 
        
Outdir 
 
 
0.028 
(0.713) 
0.163 
(0.129) 
1.000 
 
       
Indir 
 
 
-0.043 
(0.570) 
-0.041 
(0.707) 
-0.554** 
(0.000) 
1.000 
 
      
Graydir 
 
 
-0.044 
(0.558) 
-0.113 
(0.293) 
-0.815** 
(0.000) 
0.075 
(0.320) 
1.000 
 
     
Instdir 
 
 
0.034 
(0.655) 
-0.191 
(0.074) 
0.351** 
(0.000) 
-0.270** 
(0.000) 
-0.285** 
(0.000) 
1.000 
 
    
Bsize 
 
 
-0.028 
(0.708) 
-0.094 
(0.385) 
0.199** 
(0.008) 
-0.241** 
(0.001) 
-0.091 (0.228) 0.151* 
(0.045) 
1.000 
 
   
Dceo 
 
 
-0.096 
(0.203) 
0.103 
(0.337) 
-0.079 
(0.297) 
0.236** 
(0.002) 
0.026 
(0.728) 
0.030 
(0.692) 
-0.158* 
(0.035) 
1.000   
DA 
 
 
-0.168* 
(0.025) 
-0.031 
(0.772) 
-0.116 
(0.122) 
0.128 
(0.087) 
0.095 
(0.208) 
-0.072 
(0.338) 
-0.122 
(0.104) 
0.087 
(0.248) 
1.000 
 
 
DWCA 
 
-0.223** 
(0.003) 
-0.022 
(0.838) 
-0.027 
(0.724) 
0.123 
(0.102) 
-0.055 
(0.468) 
0.030 
(0.692) 
-0.077 
(0.307) 
0.022 
(0.767) 
0.281** 
(0.000) 
1.000 
 
 
 
 
related at the 5% level to discretionary working capital 
accruals. 
 
An analysis of board of director compositions and 
characteristics and earnings management on fraud: 
An analysis of board of director compositions and 
characteristics and Discretionary Accruals on fraud   
 
This paper used the result of section 4.2 to avoid the 
collinearity found in the regression analysis, hence, 
constructing the following logistic regression that the 
system of independent directors and supervisors do not 
establish before 2002. After 2002, following the 
construction of the system of independent directors and 
supervisors (Inddir denotes independent directors ratio), 
this paper constructed the following logistic regression. 
 
Model 1:  
 
Fraud = 0 +OutdirOutdir +DceoDceo 
+DADA+Outdir×DAOutdir×DA+Dceo×DADceo×DA+FsizeFsiz
e + TSE TSE + ROA ROA+ Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup +; 
Model 2:  
 
Fraud=0+IndirIndir+GraydirGraydir+DADA 
+Indir×DAIndir×DA +Graydir×DAGraydir×DA +FsizFsize 
+TSETSE +ROAROA +DebtDebt +Bgroup Bgroup +;  
 
Model 3: 
 
Fraud=0+GraydirGraydir+BsizeBsize+DADA+Graydir×DAGr
aydir×DA+Bsize×DABsize×DA+Fsize Fsize +TSE TSE +ROA 
ROA +Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup+;  
 
Model 4: 
 
Fraud=0+GraydirGraydir+DceoDceo+DADA+Graydir×DAGra
ydir×DA+Dceo×DADceo×DA +Fsize Fsize +TSE TSE + ROA 
ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup +;  
 
Model 5: 
 
Fraud =0 +Instdir Instdir +Dceo Dceo +DA DA +Instdir×DA 
Instdir×DA+ Dceo ×DADceo×DA+Fsize Fsize +TSE TSE 
  
 
 
+ROA ROA +Debt Debt +Bgroup Bgroup+; 
 
Where Outdir denotes outside director ratio, Indir denotes 
insider director ratio, Graydir denotes gray  director  ratio, 
Instdir denotes institutional investor ratio, Bsize denotes 
board size, Instdir denotes institutional investor ratio, 
Dceo denotes Chairman as CEO that equals 1 when it 
corresponds with Chairman as CEO, and otherwise 
equals 0. DA denotes discretionary accruals; Fsize 
denotes firm size that was calculated as the difference in 
the logarithms of total asset. TSE denotes industry 
category, ROA denotes financial performance, Debt 
denotes ratio of debt and Bgroup denotes group 
enterprise. Table 4 reveals result of board of director 
compositions and characteristics and discretionary 
accruals on fraud that the system of independent 
directors and supervisors is not to be established (before 
2002). The Likelihood Ratio of all model are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Discretionary accruals and 
board of director compositions and characteristics are 
insignificantly related to fraud at 5% significant level. Only 
ratio of debt exist the significantly positive relation. 
Moreover, following the system of independent 
directors and supervisors is to be established (after 
2002), Table 5 reveals result of board of director 
compositions and characteristics and discretionary 
accruals on fraud. In model 1, Chairman as CEO is 
significantly negative related to fraud at 5% significant 
level and institutional investor ratio is significantly 
negative related to fraud at 5% significant level in model 
5. The interaction of independent director’s ratio and 
discretionary accruals that exists shows significantly 
positive relation in model 4 and 5.  
In this study, the variables of independent directors’ 
ratio and insider director ratio are not significant to fraud 
at 5% significant level although their coefficient exist 
expected signs. Then, the variables of outside director 
ratio, gray director ratio and board size all have negative 
sign but are not significant to fraud at 5% significant level. 
However the coefficient of discretionary accruals and the 
interactive effect (Outdir × DA, Indir × DA, Graydir × DA, 
Instdir × DA, Bsize × DA, Dceo × DA) are also not 
significant. Moreover, the control variable of firm size is 
significantly positive to fraud at 5% significant level and 
the variable of financial performance has significantly 
negative sign in model 2 and 3. The variable of ratio of 
debt shows significantly positive sign in model 1 and 4. 
Pre-construction of the system of independent directors 
and supervisors, institutional investor ratio is not 
statistically significant in relation to fraud. However 
institutional investor ratio is a significantly negative sign 
following the establishment of the system of directors and 
supervisors that are the same as result of Sharma (2004) 
and Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008). Similarly, 
Chairman as CEO is insignificant in pre- establishment of 
the system of independent directors and supervisors and 
is significantly  negative   sign  in   post – period  that  are  
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inconsistent with Dunn (2004) and Sharma (2004). The 
result indicated that when chairman works as CEO 
concurrently, the administration will work hard to reduce 
the fraudulent possibility as a result of the self 
responsibility and achievement motivation (Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008). Furthermore, there is no significant 
reverse relation between independent directors ratio and 
fraud. Unfortunately, the results are discordant with 
Beasley (1998), Uzun et al. (2004) and Sharma (2004). 
This phenomenon may be attributed to independent 
directors not making full use of their functions. However 
outside director ratio is insignificant in relation to fraud 
around construction of the system of independent 
directors and supervisors that are inconsistent with 
Beasley (1996), Uzun et al. (2004). The outside director 
can not decrease the ability of supervisors that may be 
attributed to ownership structure of domestic enterprises 
always focus on family enterprises and devoted to the 
acquisition of parent company by cross holding. 
Moreover, inside director ratio and gray director ratio are 
also insignificant sign to fraud that the former are 
discordant with Joyce (1989), Dechow et al. (1996) and 
latter are discordant with Beasley (1998), Uzun et al. 
(2004). The former ascribed insignificant sign to most of 
inside directors participated in corporate operation. Then, 
the latter found that high gray director ratio can not affect 
fraud as a result of which there are business activities 
between gray directors and the administrator. 
In addition, board size and discretionary accruals are 
also insignificant positive sign to fraud. Bigger board size 
will enhance the quality of decisions even though that is 
hard to make efficiently decisions that are discordant with 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993). Then, the 
latter are inconsistent with Sweeney (1994) and Beneish 
(1997). In fact, earning represents the whole of business 
enterprise. The administrator applied elastic accounting 
principles to regulate earning that do not constitute an act 
of fraud (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Bowen et al., 2008). 
Finally, marginally significant sign did not exist in the 
interactive variable about discretionary accruals (Outdir × 
DA, Indir × DA, Graydir × DA, Instdir × DA, Bsize × DA, 
Dceo × DA) during pre - and post - construction of the 
system of independent directors and supervisors. Hence, 
the interactive variable of independent director ratio and 
discretionary accruals whose coefficient did not change. A 
set that is not consistent with Beasley (1998), Uzun et al. 
(2004) and Sharma (2004). The interpretation of 
insufficiently independent directors that the supervisal 
ability of broad of director was assured by high 
independent director ratio. 
 
 
An analysis of board of director compositions and 
characteristics and discretionary working capital 
accruals on fraud   
 
Similarly,   this   paper  constructed  the  following  logistic 
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Table 4. Board of director and discretionary accruals on fraud (1999~2001). 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Outdir 
 
 
-0.536 
(0.925) 
    
Indir 
 
 
 1.265 
(1.416) 
   
Graydir 
 
 
 -0.222 
(0.902) 
-0.227 
(0.903) 
-0.166 
(0.889) 
 
Instdir 
 
 
    -0.256 
(0.755) 
Bsize 
 
 
  -0.091 
(0.079) 
  
Dceo 
 
 
-0.041 
(0596) 
  -0.013 
(0.591) 
-0.049 
(0.601) 
DA 
 
 
5.63E-07 
(5.50E-07) 
-4.65E-07 
(3.41E-07) 
1.71E-07 
(5.63E-07) 
-1.64E-07 
(2.39E-07) 
8.51E-07 
(6.26E-07) 
Outdir × DA 
 
 
-9.35E-07 
(7.50E-07) 
    
Indir × DA 
 
 
 1.93E-06 
(1.68E-06) 
   
Graydir × DA 
 
 
 5.80E-07 
(8.06E-07) 
4.04E-07 
(7.83E-07) 
5.77E-07 
(7.03E-07) 
 
Instdir × DA 
 
 
    -1.15E-06 
(7.45E-07) 
Bsize × DA 
 
 
  -4.00E-08 
(5.07E-08) 
  
Dceo × DA 
 
 
-3.65E-07 
(6.80E-07) 
  -4.63E-07 
(6.73E-07) 
-5.80E-07 
(7.37E-07) 
Firm size 
 
 
0.071 
(0.307) 
0.135 
(0.313) 
0.134 
(0.313) 
0.067 
(0.306) 
0.170 
(0.315) 
Industry category 
 
 
0.030 
(0.057) 
0.019 
(0.056) 
0.016 
(0.058) 
0.030 
0.056 
0.016 
(0.057) 
Financial performance 
 
 
-0.050 
(0.043) 
-0.067 
(0.045) 
-0.066 
(0.044) 
-0.052 
(0.042) 
-0.057 
(0.043) 
Ratio of debt 
 
 
0.056** 
(0.018) 
0.055** 
(0.019) 
0.055** 
(0.019) 
0.055** 
0.018 
0.057** 
(0.019) 
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Ratio of group 
Enterprise 
 
0.648 
(0.818) 
0.658 
(0.820) 
0.566 
(0.808) 
0.547 
(0.801) 
0.410 
(0.790) 
Constant 
 
 
-4.471 
(4.525) 
-5.917 
(4.663) 
-4.828 
(4.545) 
-4.532 
(4.534) 
-5.911 
(4.699) 
Likelihood ratio 90.872** 90.186** 91.717** 92.611** 90.270** 
 
Model 1: Fraud = 0 + Outdir Outdi r + Dceo Dceo +DA DA + Outdir ×DA Outdir × DA+ Dceo  × DA Dceo × DA + Fsize Fsize  
+ TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup + ;  
 
Model 2: Fraud = 0 + Indir Indir + Graydir Graydir + DA DA + Indir×DA Indir×DA+ Graydir×DA Graydir×DA+ Fsize Fsize  
+TSE TSE + ROA ROA +Debt Debt +Bgroup Bgroup +;  
Model 3: Fraud = 0 + Graydir Graydir + Bsize Bsize + DA DA + Graydir×DA Graydi r× DA+ Bsize × DA Bsize × DA+ Fsize Fsize  
+TSE TSE +ROA ROA +Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup+;  
Model 4: Fraud = 0 +Graydir Graydir +Dceo Dceo + DA DA+Graydir×DA Graydir×DA + Dceo ×DA Dceo × DA + Fsize Fsize  
+TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup +;  
Model 5: Fraud = 0 +Instdir Instdir +Dceo Dceo +DA DA +Instdir×DA Instdir×DA+ Dceo ×DADceo×DA+Fsize Fsize  
+ TSE TSE +ROA ROA +Debt Debt +Bgroup Bgroup+. 
 
Notes: 1. ** (*) denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) level.  
2. S. D. denotes standard deviation. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Board of director and discretionary accruals on fraud (2002~2004). 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Inddir 
 
6.383 
(3.549) 
5.581 
(3.308) 
5.076 
(3.156) 
6.138 
(3.361) 
6.572 
(3.790) 
 
Outdir 
 
-0.663 
(1.192) 
    
 
Indir 
  
0.245 
(1.547) 
   
Graydir 
  
-0.006 
(1.063) 
 
-0.071 
(1.071) 
 
-0.002 
(1.103) 
 
Instdir 
     
-2.226* 
(1.072) 
Bsize 
   
-0.115 
(0.106) 
  
Dceo 
 
-1.196* 
(0.591) 
   
-1.074 
(0.551) 
 
-1.061 
(0.585) 
DA 
 
-2.20E-06 
(1.14E-06) 
 
2.23E-07 
(3.95E-07) 
 
5.14E-07 
(7.41E-07) 
 
-8.9E-07 
(5.67E-07) 
 
-1.60E-06 
(8.45E-07) 
Inddir× DA 
 
6.36E-06 
(3.57E-06) 
 
4.16E-06 
(2.81E-06) 
 
4.11E-06 
(2.77E-06) 
 
6.97E-06* 
(3.51E-06) 
 
9.93E-06* 
(4.57E-06) 
Outdir × DA 
 
2.17E-06 
(1.62E-06) 
    
506        Afr. J. Bus. Manage. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Contd. 
 
Indir × DA   
-7.00E-07 
(8.53E-07) 
   
Graydir × DA   
4.81E-07 
(1.04E-06) 
 
-4.00E-07 
(6.96E-07) 
 
-1.50E-07 
(6.97E-07) 
 
Instdir × DA      
1.46E-06 
(1.08E-06) 
Bsize × DA    
-8.50E-08 
(1.10E-07) 
  
Dceo × DA  
1.09E-06 
(5.92E-07) 
   
8.69E-07 
(5.53E-07) 
 
8.76E-07 
(5.44E-07) 
Firm size  
0.649* 
(0.310) 
 
0.826** 
(0.293) 
 
0.829** 
(0.294) 
 
0.688* 
(0.300) 
 
0.926* 
(0.366) 
Industry category  
-0.008 
(0.066) 
 
-0.023 
(0.063) 
 
-0.008 
(0.066) 
 
-0.021 
(0.067) 
 
-0.029 
(0.066) 
Financial performance  
-0.050 
(0.027) 
 
-0.059* 
(0.025) 
 
-0.054* 
(0.023) 
 
-0.042 
(0.024) 
 
-0.044 
(0.026) 
Ratio of debt  
0.041* 
(0.020) 
 
0.024 
(0.017) 
 
0.027 
(0.018) 
 
0.039* 
(0.019) 
 
0.040* 
(0.020) 
Ratio of group enterprise  
0.418 
(0.787) 
 
0.021 
(0.727) 
 
0.086 
(0.729) 
 
0.201 
(0.743) 
 
0.386 
(0.776) 
Constant  
-11.522* 
(4.516) 
 
-13.964** 
(4.378) 
 
-13.463** 
(4.302) 
 
-12.180** 
(4.402) 
 
-14.942** 
(5.066) 
Likelihood ratio  
85.214** 
 
94.321** 
 
92.922** 
 
88.524** 
 
81.096** 
 
Model 1: Fraud = 0+Inddir Inddir + Outdir Outdir+Dceo Dceo + DAD + Inddir  ×  DAInddir × DA+ Outdir × DAOutdir × DA 
+Dceo ×DA Dceo×DA + Fsize Fsize + TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup +;  
Model 2: Fraud = 0 + InddirInddir +IndirIndir + GraydirGraydir + DADA + Inddir × DAInddir × DA + Indir × DAIndir × DA 
+ Graydir × DA Graydir×DA+ Fsize Fsize + TSE TSE + ROA ROA +Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup +;  
Model 3:Fraud = 0 + Inddir Inddir + Graydir Graydir + Bsize Bsize + DA DA + Inddir × DA Inddir × DA+ Graydir × DA Graydir × DA 
+Bsize × DA Bsize × DA+Fsize Fsize + TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup + ;  
Model 4: Fraud = 0 +Inddir Inddir+ Graydir Graydir + Dceo Dceo + DA DA+ Inddir×DA Inddir × DA + Graydir × DA Graydir × DA 
+Dceo × DA Dceo × DA +Fsize Fsize + TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup +;  
Model 4: Fraud = 0 + Inddir  Inddir + Instdir Instdir +Dceo Dceo +DA DA + Inddir × DA Inddir × DA +Instdir × DA Instdir × DA 
+ Dceo × DADceo × DA+ Fsize Fsize + TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt +Bgroup Bgroup + ; 
 
Notes: 1. ** (*) denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) level.  
2. S. D. denotes standard deviation. 
 
 
 
regression to explore the influence of board of director 
compositions and characteristics and discretionary 
working capital accruals on fraud that the system of 
independent directors and supervisors do not establish 
before 2002. After 2002, following the construction of the 
system of  independent  directors   and  supervisors,  this 
  
 
 
paper constructed the following logistic regression. 
 
Model 1:  
 
Fraud = 0 +OutdirOutdir + DceoDceo + DWCADWCA + 
 
Outdir×DWCAOutdir×DWCA + Dceo×DWCADceo×DWCA + 
Fsize Fsize + TSE TSE + ROA ROA +  Debt Debt + Bgroup 
Bgroup + ; 
 
Model 2:  
 
Fraud=0+IndirIndir+GraydirGraydir+DWCADWCA+Indir×DW
CAIndir×DWCA+Graydir×DWCAGraydir×DWCA +FsizFsize 
+TSETSE +ROAROA +DebtDebt +Bgroup Bgroup +;  
 
Model 3:  
 
Fraud=0+GraydirGraydir+BsizeBsize+DWCADWCA+Graydir
×DWCAGraydir×DWCA+Bsize×DWCABsize×DWCA+Fsize 
Fsize +TSE TSE +ROA ROA +Debt Debt + Bgroup 
Bgroup+;  
 
Model 4: 
 
Fraud=0+GraydirGraydir+DceoDceo+DWCADWCA+Graydir
×DWCAGraydir×DWCA+Dceo×DWCADceo×DWCA +Fsize  
Fsize +TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup 
+ 
 
Model 5:  
 
Fraud = 0+Instdir Instdir + Dceo Dceo + DWCA DWCA + 
Instdir×DWCA Instdir×DWCA+ Dceo  × DWCADceo×DWCA + 
Fsize Fsize + TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup 
Bgroup + ; 
 
The results of effect of board of director compositions and 
characteristics and discretionary working capital accruals 
on fraud are shown in Table 6 in pre- construction of the 
system of independent directors and supervisors. Then, 
the likelihood ratio statistic is also presented statistical 
significant that indicated these model possess 
explanatory ability. Unfortunately, the results could not 
serve as evidence that board of director compositions 
and characteristics and discretionary working capital 
accruals did not affect fraud even though the interactive 
effect of institutional investor ratio and discretionary 
working capital accruals exist significant negative sign in 
Model 5. Table 7 present effect of board of director 
compositions and characteristics and discretionary 
working capital accruals on fraud, following financial 
supervisory commission of executive, yuan formally 
implemented the system of independent directors and 
supervisors. First, Chairman as CEO shows statistically 
significant negative sign in all model and the results are 
inconsistent with  Dunn (2004)  and  Sharma  (2004)  that  
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could serve as evidence that the administration will work 
hard to reduce the fraudulent possibility as a result of the 
self responsibility and achievement motivation. Discre-
tionary working capital accruals also shows significant 
negative sign in model 4 and 5 that are inconsistent with 
Healy (1985) and Teoh et al. (1998). In fact, the exceed-
ing variation of profit and loss will result in negative 
evaluation of market participator; hence, the administrator 
usually utilized elastic accounting principles to regulate 
earning. 
The variables of independent director ratio, outside 
director ratio and inside director ratio have positive sign 
but are not statistically significant sign. Similarly, the 
variables of gray director ratio, institutional investor ratio 
and board size have negative sign but are not statistically 
significant. Moreover, during pre - and post - construction 
of the system of independent directors and supervisors, 
there are not expected significant sign in the interactive 
tern about discretionary accruals (Inddir × DWCA, Outdir 
× DWCA, Indir × DWCA, Graydir × DWCA, Instdir × 
DWCA, Bsize × DWCA and Dceo × DWCA) although all 
control variables have their expected signs in all models 
and Sharma. Furthermore, pre-construction of the system 
of independent directors and supervisors, the interactive 
tern of discretionary accruals and institutional investor 
ratio exist negative sign on the fraud but this sign did not 
significant in post - construction of the system of 
independent directors and supervisors. The results 
indicate that the institutional director support the manager 
tend to communion of self -interests following conflict of 
interest between institutional investor and corporate 
although institutional director whose background with 
professional knowledge and skills. Hence, the 
professional institutional director can not reduce the 
possibility of fraud. The interactive variable of 
discretionary accruals and independent investor ratio also 
did not show expected negative sign that is inconsistent 
with Beasley (1998), Uzun et al. (2004). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The study explores whether board of director 
compositions and characteristics and earnings 
management have an effect on corporate financial fraud. 
The results from our analysis show that there is no 
significant difference on corporate financial fraud between 
pre - and post the system of independent directors and 
supervisors. The focus of the administration in Taiwanese 
companies is family enterprises that did not necessarily 
separate ownership from managerial authority although 
Government gradually perceived the importance of 
corporate governance. Government had to consider 
whether western supervisor system is suitable for Taiwan 
before thoroughly adopted western supervisor system. At 
present, the current system of supervisor system did not 
reflect Taiwanese economic system, market structure and 
culture characteristic  that  result  in  confusion  of  power,  
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Table 6. Board of director and discretionary working capital accruals on fraud (1999~2001). 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Outdir -0.129 (0.965) 
    
Indir 
  
0.759 
(1.542) 
   
Graydir 
  
-0.627 
(0.965) 
 
-0.358 
(0.941) 
 
-0.250 
(0.906) 
 
Instdir 
     
0.535 
(0.814) 
Bsize 
   
-0.144 
(0.099) 
  
Dceo 
 
0.257 
(0.698) 
   
0.302 
(0.697) 
 
0.134 
(0.760) 
DWCA 
 
9.39E-08 
(1.80E-07) 
 
-5.51E-07 
(3.00E-07) 
 
5.33E-07 
(5.09E-07) 
 
-2.34E-07 
(2.03E-07) 
 
3.67E-07 
(2.42E-07) 
Outdir ×DWCA 
 
-6.22E-07 
(4.44E-07) 
    
Indir ×DWCA 
  
9.25E-07 
(6.54E-07) 
   
Graydir ×DWCA 
  
2.84E-07 
(4.90E-07) 
 
1.28E-07 
(5.33E-07) 
 
3.39E-07 
(5.14E-07) 
 
Instdir ×DWCA 
     
-1.01E-06* 
(5.12E-07) 
Bsize ×DWCA 
   
-1.28E-07 
(7.71E-08) 
  
Dceo ×DWCA 
 
-2.32E-07 
(4.57E-07) 
   
-3.49E-07 
(4.54E-07) 
 
-3.13E-07 
(5.13E-07) 
Firm size 
 
0.295 
(0.325) 
 
0.290 
(0.321) 
 
0.319 
(0.351) 
 
0.272 
(0.322) 
 
0.378 
(0.326) 
Industry category 
 
0.038 
(0.057) 
 
0.028 
(0.058) 
 
0.018 
(0.059) 
 
0.041 
(0.057) 
 
0.047 
(0.059) 
Financial performance 
 
-0.051 
(0.040) 
 
-0.065 
(0.042) 
 
-0.055 
(0.042) 
 
-0.054 
(0.039) 
 
-0.061 
(0.042) 
Ratio of debt 
 
0.046* 
(0.019) 
 
0.049* 
(0.020) 
 
0.044* 
(0.019) 
 
0.045* 
(0.018) 
 
0.039* 
(0.019) 
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Ratio of group enterprise  
0.712 
(0.791) 
 
0.672 
(0.802) 
 
0.608 
(0.789) 
 
0.628 
(0.793) 
 
0.779 
(0.814) 
Constant  
-7.687 
(4.845) 
 
-7.703 
(4.842) 
 
-6.777 
(5.072) 
 
-7.308 
(4.820) 
 
-9.151 
(4.935) 
Likelihood ratio  
87.332** 
 
87.553** 
 
83.429** 
 
89.744** 
 
84.557** 
 
Model 1: Fraud = 0 +Outdir Outdir + Dceo Dceo + DA DA + Outdir ×WCDA Outdir × DWCA+ Dceo × DWCA Dceo × DWCA 
+ Fsize
 
Fsize + TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup + ; 
Model 2: Fraud = 0+IndirIndir + GraydirGraydir + DWCADWCA + Indir×DWCAIndir × DWCA+ Graydir× DWCA Graydir × DWCA 
+ Fsize
 
Fsize +TSE TSE + ROA ROA +Debt Debt +Bgroup Bgroup+;  
Model 3: Fraud = 0 +GraydirGraydir +BsizeBsize + DWCADWCA + Graydir × DWCAGraydir × DWCA+ Bsize × DWCA Bsize × 
DWCA 
+ Fsize
 
Fsize + TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup + ;  
Model 4:Fraud =0+GraydirGraydir +DceoDceo + DWCADWCA + Graydir × DWCAGraydir × DWCA+ Dceo ×DWCA Dceo×DWCA  
+Fsize Fsize +TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup +;  
Model 5: Fraud = 0 +Instdir Instdir + Dceo Dceo + DWCA DWCA +Instdir×DWCA Instdir × DWCA+ Dceo × DWCADceo × DWCA 
+ Fsize
 
Fsize + TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup+; 
 
Notes: 1. ** (*) denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) level.  
2. S. D. denotes standard deviation. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Board of director and discretionary working capital accruals on fraud (2002~2004). 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Inddir 2.804 (3.233) 
2.754 
(3.157) 
2.797 
(3.170) 
2.590 
(3.279) 
2.251 
(3.355) 
Outdir 
 
0.165 
1.279 
    
Indir 
  
0.637 
(1.751) 
   
Graydir 
  
-1.432 
(1.220) 
 
-1.487 
(1.259) 
 
-0.988 
(1.285) 
 
Instdir 
     
-2.006 
(1.170) 
Bsize 
   
-0.195 
(0.111) 
  
Dceo 
 
-1.774* 
(0.715) 
   
-1.691* 
(0.718) 
 
-1.760* 
(0.714) 
DWCA 
 
-5.30E-07 
(3.12E-07) 
 
-3.60E-07 
(1.86E-07) 
 
-6.20E-07 
(3.71E-07) 
 
-6.80E-07** 
(2.42E-07) 
 
-7.10E-07* 
(3.26E-07) 
Inddir× DWCA 
 
2.37E-06 
(3.30E-06) 
 
3.28E-07 
(3.10E-06) 
 
-2.70E-07 
(3.12E-06) 
 
2.24E-06 
(3.30E-06) 
 
1.99E-06 
(3.43E-06) 
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Table 7. Contd. 
 
Outdir × DWCA  
-1.40E-07 
(3.24E-07) 
    
Indir × DWCA   
-1.90E-07 
(3.10E-07) 
   
Graydir × DWCA   
1.05E-06 
(5.96E-07) 
 
8.87E-07 
(4.89E-07) 
 
5.30E-07 
(4.77E-07) 
 
Instdir × DWCA      
1.51E-07 
(3.28E-07) 
Bsize × DWCA    
2.00E-08 
(4.19E-08) 
  
Dceo × DWCA  
4.29E-07 
(2.77E-07) 
   
4.19E-07 
(2.50E-07) 
 
4.79E-07 
(2.74E-07) 
Firm Size  
1.172** 
(0.366) 
 
1.035** 
(0.320) 
 
1.242** 
(0.363) 
 
1.159** 
(0.366) 
 
1.416** 
(0.409) 
Industry Category  
0.006 
(0.068) 
 
-0.014 
(0.067) 
 
0.012 
(0.071) 
 
-0.002 
(0.070) 
 
-0.008 
(0.068) 
Financial 
Performance 
 
-0.071* 
(0.028) 
 
-0.057* 
(0.023) 
 
-0.063** 
(0.024) 
 
-0.070* 
(0.029) 
 
-0.076** 
(0.029) 
Ratio of Debt  
0.022 
(0.021) 
 
0.010 
(0.018) 
 
0.004 
(0.018) 
 
0.023 
(0.021) 
 
0.018 
(0.021) 
Ratio of Group 
Enterprise 
 
0.028 
(0.775) 
 
-0.371 
(0.737) 
 
-0.322 
(0.741) 
 
-0.060 
(0.770) 
 
0.194 
(0.762) 
Constant  
-18.463** 
(5.322) 
 
-15.892** 
(4.600) 
 
-17.545** 
(4.940) 
 
-17.813** 
(5.245) 
 
-21.003** 
(5.592) 
Likelihood Ratio  
83.989** 
 
89.181** 
 
86.290** 
 
82.764** 
 
80.957** 
 
Model 1: 
Fraud = 0 + InddirInddir + OutdirOutdir + DceoDceo + DWCADWCA + Inddir×DWCAInddir × DWCA+ Outdir × DWCA Outdir × DWCA 
+Dceo ×DWCA Dceo×DWCA+ Fsize Fsize + TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup +; 
Model 2:  
Fraud = 0 + InddirInddir + Indir Indir + Graydir Graydir + DWCA DWCA + Inddir × DWCA Inddi r × DWCA + Indir×DWCA Indir×DWCA 
+ Graydir × DWCA Graydir × DWCA+ Fsize Fsize +TSE TSE + ROA ROA +Debt Debt +Bgroup Bgroup + ; 
Model3: 
Fraud =   0 + InddirInddir+ GraydirGraydir +BsizeBsize+ DWCADWCA + Inddir×DWCAInddir× DWCA+Graydir×DWCA Graydir×DWCA 
+Bsize×DWCA Bsize×DWCA+Fsize Fsize +TSE TSE +ROA ROA +Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup+; 
Model 4:  
Fraud =0 +InddirInddir + GraydirGraydir+ DceoDceo +DWCADWCA+ Inddir×DWCAInddir × DWCA + Graydir × DWCA Graydir × DWCA 
+Dceo × DWCA Dceo × DWCA + Fsize Fsize + TSE TSE + ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup + ; 
Model 5:  
Fraud = 0 +Inddir Inddir+Instdir Instdir +Dceo Dceo + DWCADWCA+ Inddir × DWCA Inddir × DWCA + Instdir×DWCA Instdir × DWCA 
+ Dceo
 × DWCADceo × DWCA+ Fsize Fsize + TSE TSE +ROA ROA + Debt Debt + Bgroup Bgroup+ ; 
 
Notes: 1. ** (*) denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) level.  
2. S. D. denotes standard deviation. 
  
 
 
hence, affect the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
The phenomena of cross holdings and fraud of top 
manager must be averted and the protection of the 
interests for small shareholders when adaptive corporate 
governance is to be act immediately. Moreover, level of 
information disclosure is the important parameter to dia-
gnose the quality of corporate governance (Chemmanur 
et al., 2009). The opaque information of companies was 
always potential high risk group of financial fraud, hence, 
the level of information disclosure which served as an 
important foundation of investment evaluation for inves-
tors. Therefore, the investors can acquire the public 
information of practical operation from annual reports and 
“Market Observation Post System” that was established 
by Government. The mechanism of corporate gover-
nance in Taiwanese companies devotes to improvement 
of frame and operation in broad of directors such as 
increase of independent directors although it was difficult 
to get rid of vivid family characteristics and the influence 
of insider and gray directors in seconds. Hence, with 
Western trend, the performance of directors was eva-
luated by broad of directors to enhance the performance 
that can serve as example to Taiwanese companies.  
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